The report of the working party to formulate a code of practice for preventing infection in clinical laboratories and postmortem rooms1 was completed in January 1978. Although the code did not appear in print until 12 months later (the report was not published) photocopies of the original report and code were widely circulated and both they and the printed version provoked a good deal of comment, some of which has been expressed in print2-8 and some made to us personally.
The working party was disbanded after its report was delivered to the Department of Health and Social Security, and we therefore feel free to express our views, as private individuals, on some of these general criticisms and specific complaints. Together with our own later thoughts and hopes on the report and code, this communication may be regarded as a personal contribution to the necessary and continuing debate on the code, which we naturally welcome.
Background to the code After the escape of smallpox from the London School of Hygiene in 1973,9 DHSS accepted, as one of the recommendations of the Godber Report on dangerous pathogens,'°that a code of practice should be drawn up for preventing infection in clinical laboratories and postmortem rooms. In 1975 a working party was set up to draft such a code, and late in 1978 the code was published.' Edinburgh SIR JAMES HOWIE, MD, HON FIMLS, member of the working party which produced the code The Ashes, Hadlow, Kent, TN11 OAS C H COLLINS, FIBIOL, FIMLS, member of the working party which produced the code Why was it necessary to codify good safety precautions? Experienced laboratory workers, especially in microbiology laboratories, knew the dangers of their occupation and assessed them realistically, neither exaggerating the dangers nor treating them with contempt. Nevertheless, in 1957, it had come as a surprise to many that various categories of laboratory workers were from two to nine times more likely to acquire and die of tuberculosis than (5) The continuing importance of tuberculosis as a laboratoryacquired infection cannot be overestimated and needs constant reiteration,'5 but the position with hepatitis has somewhat changed. The working party was sure that the risk was in the course of being understood and coped with; but strong advocacy of the need to keep the precautions in being until this was certain was sufficient to persuade the members that the precautions should stand at that stage. To have insisted on the contrary line would have led to a minority report. Recent findings26 27 and, again, hindsight have persuaded us28 that hepatitis B virus should now belong not to category B2 but to category C, thus bringing it into line with informed American opinion.29 It should be remembered, however, that the techniques prescribed for handling category C material in this code of practice are a great advance on those in common use in some laboratories. (6) The inclusion of Salmonella typhi in category B has invoked comment. It has been wrongly supposed by some people that the category B pathogens were all thought by the working party to be hazardous because they were associated with air-borne infections. Most of the agents listed are conveyed by the airborne route, but we were well aware that S typhi is an alimentary infection. We put it in category B because it is often treated far too casually, as in its use, for example, as the test organism in the Rideal-Walker test. If S typhi were to be retained for this purpose, which we should deplore as unnecessary even if international agreement for change is hard to negotiate, it must certainly be regarded as an organism that causes a very serious infection, and it should therefore be treated with the care due to a category B pathogen. In the United States, since 1977, there have been 19 laboratory-associated infections,'0 which confirms the belief of the working party that this organism should be handled with special precautions in special accommodation. (7) Arguments, for instance, that of Brownhill,' that decontamination of centrifuges will necessitate the supply of large numbers of these machines are wrongly based. If the centrifuges are properly maintained and used correctly there will be fewer accidents and less need for decontamination. (At the Dulwich laboratory there has been one accident concerning pathogens in five years.) Simple cleaning with disinfectant and daily inspection take only a few minutes. (8) As for complaints about the use of the Coulter Counter and automated chemistry equipment, the techniques described are based on observations made in several busy laboratories-although, to be quite fair, they were laboratories in which infections of one kind or another had occurred or were feared. (9) The requirement to carry medical contact (NOT ID) cards has drawn criticism, but it does not seem to worry those who habitually do so, along with allergy cards, credit cards, driving licence, and AA and other membership cards. The requirement is not really a cause for being anxious about the premature realisation of George Orwell's fear for the future. (10) Certainly the code has generated a great deal of excitement and activity; but this is welcome. Not all those who have been critical realise that there are laboratories where standards have been allowed to fall so low that management quite rightly fears a visit by an inspector from the Health and Safety Executive. If all laboratories were as good, and all staff as sensible, as the best we have seen there would have been no need for the code; but several reports and publications'5 31 and the intense public concern over the Birmingham 1978 episode show that DHSS simply had no alternative to issuing a code of practice. (11) Of course, there were two hazards inherent in the code itself: that it would become a tool for militants and a vehicle for managers, to the detriment of the safety of the staff. Both have happened; people have been frightened into declining appointment as safety officers; some have demanded money for doing very little more than their usual day's work; and others have invented new titles and more jargon. For none of this was the working party responsible. Fortunately, in many laboratories, up and down the country, dedicated safety officers are quietly at work and are doing a very good job. (12) We are quite impenitent about the use of the word "must."
It allowed the really important hazards and precautions to be identified.2' Experience with other codes had shown that "should" was usually interpreted as "need not." (13) The code was never intended to be the final word. The working party advocated keeping it up-to-date in the light of experience and indeed DHSS and a number of other organisations have set up committees and groups of varying experience (and expertise) to look at the code as it stands, to refine it, and to look at its interpretation by HSE inspectors and its relevance or otherwise to laboratories for which it was not intended.
Priorities and hopes
The working party identified two priorities: (1) the prevention of tuberculosis, and (2) the prevention of hepatitis. The DHSS circular on implementation wisely added a third-namely, (3) the need to appoint and train safety officers and educate all concerned in medical work-not only those in laboratories-on the importance of safety precautions. We agree with that advice but would emphasise that the training of safety officers must be to nationally agreed standards. Some courses that are meantime being offered are not only insufficient but actually in danger of misleading. It is of paramount importance that these courses should be good enough because real safety against infection risks is proportional to the awareness that all members of a laboratory have of the real nature of the materials they are handling. There must be neither contempt for nor exaggerated fears of infection risks; and only adequate training and learning from experienceincluding the experience of others-can ensure this. If we had our job to do again we should add a fourth priority- (4) his condition stabilised-a chronic vegetative state with a right hemiplegia. The tracheostomy could not be dispensed with owing to feeble coughing, and suction might be needed several times an hour. Feeding was by nasogastric tube, and there was an indwelling urethral catheter. His weight was 90 kg and height 1 78 m. After six weeks there was little further improvement, and we were asked to plan his transfer to Moscow by commercial aircraft.
The plan was to fly by Air New Zealand (ANZ) from Dunedin via Auckland to Singapore and there pick up an Aeroflot connection to Moscow. Minimum requirements necessitated stopovers of at least 24 hours at Auckland and Singapore, with hospital special care facilities available. A stretcher and a generous supply of oxygen were to be available in all aircraft and he would be accompanied by a doctor and a nurse, who were to have hotel accommodation at stopovers. A day was set after which the patient would be ready to travel. We would accompany the patient to Singapore and offered to go the whole way to Moscow if desired by the Soviet Government.
Commercial airlines provide facilities for the transport of invalids but the care of the patient is the total responsibility of the accompanying team. All the nursing requirements during 10 hours in the special-care ward were noted, as this was the flight time between Auckland and Singapore. The major problem was respiratory care, and constantly available suction had to be provided not only in flight but for the ground transfers. We had seen a rechargeable battery-powered suction apparatus but it was not available to us. In the event this was just as well, as the use of battery-driven equipment contravenes many commercial aircraft regulations, although equipment can be connected up to the electrical systems of the aircraft. Instead we obtained a foot-operated Ambu sucker. This turned out to be ideal; it could be used everywhere without reference to other power sources, besides having excellent suction. An Ambu bag wvas obtained in case the patient had to be respirated. The necessary medical certificates were supplied to Air New Zealand. A team was selected, with reserves if needed; the members were known to be physically fit from recent performance and thought to be in possession of their wits.
